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Abstract
Many central banks actively intervene in the foreign exchange (forex) market, although there 
is no consensus on its impact on the exchange rate level and volatility. We analyze the 
effects of daily forex interventions in four Latin American countries with infl ation targets 
—namely, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru—by fi tting GARCH-type models. These 
countries represent a broad span of intervention strategies in terms of size and frequency, 
ranging from pure discretionality to intervention rules. We also provide new evidence on the 
presence of asymmetries, which arise if foreign currency purchases and sales have different 
effects on the exchange rate. We fi nd that fi rst interventions, either isolated or initial in a rule, 
reduce exchange rate volatility, although their size plays a minor role. Our results support 
the signaling effect of interventions under infl ation targeting regimes.
Keywords: Exchange rate volatility; Foreign exchange interventions; GARCH.
JEL classifi cation: F31; G15; C54.
Resumen
Pese a que no existe un consenso sobre el impacto de las intervenciones cambiarias en el 
tipo de cambio y en su volatilidad, numerosos bancos centrales intervienen activamente en 
estos mercados. En este trabajo se analizan los efectos de las intervenciones cambiarias 
diarias de cuatro países de América Latina —en concreto, Chile, Colombia, México y 
Perú—, mediante modelos de la familia de los GARCH. Estas economías representan una 
amplia gama de estrategias de intervención en términos de tamaño y frecuencia, ya que 
comprenden de la pura discrecionalidad a la adopción de reglas cambiarias automáticas. 
También se analiza la presencia de asimetrías que surgen si las compras y las ventas de 
moneda extranjera tienen un impacto diferente en el tipo de cambio. En este trabajo se 
concluye que las primeras intervenciones, bien sean aisladas, o bien las primeras de una 
regla, tienen un efecto moderador en la volatilidad cambiaria, mientras que el tamaño 
de la intervención desempeña un papel menor. Nuestros resultados sugieren un «efecto 
señalización» de las intervenciones en economías con objetivos de infl ación.
Palabras clave: volatilidad cambiaria, intervenciones cambiarias, modelos GARCH.
Códigos JEL: F31; G15; C54.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 9 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1226
1 Introduction
Foreign exchange (forex) interventions are sales or purchases of foreign assets (typically
US dollars —USD hereafter—, but also other major currencies) aimed at impacting on
the level and/or volatility of the exchange rate. If a central bank considers that the
exchange rate has deviated excessively from its equilibrium, it would sell (buy) local
currency during periods of appreciatory (depreciatory) pressures.
Empirical evidence shows that central banks frequently perform this type of inter-
ventions, regardless of their monetary policy scheme (Stone et al., 2009). Implicitly,
monetary authorities support the idea that forex interventions are useful to manage the
exchange rate level and volatility.1 Given the policy implications of their effectiveness, a
large empirical literature has flourished but the evidence is still mixed. In particular, the
papers that analyze daily exchange rates, which is the most employed time frequency,
provide three main views. First, most works conclude that interventions do not alter
the exchange rate level and they can even increase the exchange rate volatility. See, for
instance, Baillie and Osterberg (1997), Dominguez (1998) or Edison et al. (2006). This
conclusion suggests that interventions might introduce market uncertainty. However, this
could be the result of a simultaneity problem of daily data as intervention dates probably
coincide with the response of central banks to an exchange rate volatility excess, so that
both variables would be positively correlated. Thus, concluding that higher volatility
is a result of interventions could be misleading (Kim et al., 2000). Endogeneity also
lies behind some counterintuitive results regarding the effects on the exchange rate level
which are consistent with ‘leaning against the wind’ strategies with, for instance, USD
purchases appreciating the local currency (Baillie and Osterberg, 1997).
On a more positive tone, other authors state that forex interventions can influence on
the exchange rate level and ‘calm disorderly markets’, thereby moderating the exchange
rate volatility (Kim and Pham, 2006; Hoshikawa, 2008).2 Finally, the most skeptical
1For instance, according to the surveys by Neely (2000; 2008), central banks disagree with the assertion
that intervention increases volatility.
2These authors find that high frequency forex interventions of the Reserve Bank of Australia and the
Bank of Japan, respectively, were effective to reduce the exchange rate volatility, whereas low frequency
and officially announced interventions mainly affected the exchange rate level.
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view states that forex interventions have a negligible impact on the currency level and
volatility, as shown by Dominguez (2006) for the G3.3
As reported in Adler and Tovar (2011), relatively few central banks publish their
daily forex interventions, which justifies that most of this literature is focused on country
specific analysis. Most papers analyze the G3 and Australia,4 whereas the literature
is much more scarce for emerging economies (EMEs hereafter) as authorities are more
reluctant to provide official data on their operations. Although transparency is improving,
at present only a reduced number of countries—mainly from Latin America— release
daily information, which have led to a few empirical papers. For instance, Humala and
Rodriguez (2010) and Kamil (2008) analyze Peru and Colombia, respectively, whereas
Domac¸ and Mendoza (2004) focus on Mexico and Peru. Forex interventions in EMEs
have a different nature than in developed countries, so that, in principle, their effects
could differ. In particular, EMEs tend to intervene more frequently in the forex markets
than the developed ones, independently of their monetary policy regime (Berganza and
Broto, 2012). Besides, a priori, it seems sensible that forex interventions in EMEs might
be more effective than in developed countries (Disyatat and Galati, 2007).5 However,
the evidence for EMEs is not conclusive either. For instance, Disyatat and Galati (2007)
find that interventions had no influence on the short-term volatility of the Czech koruna,
whereas Domac¸ and Mendoza (2004) find the opposite result for Mexico and Turkey.
Another relevant aspect regarding forex interventions is their wide spectrum of char-
acteristics in terms of frequency and size. For instance, in most developed countries such
as Japan, the current policy is to intervene on a discretionary basis and only under ex-
ceptional circumstances, whereas in EMEs intervention strategies differ across countries
3This author analyzes intra-daily and daily exchange rates of the G3 and concludes that interventions
can influence exchange rates only within the day.
4See, for instance, Rogers and Siklos (2003), Kim and Sheen (2002), Edison et al. (2006), Kim and
Pham (2006) for some empirical papers on Australia; Baillie and Osterberg (1997) and Dominguez (1998)
for the G3, and Frenkel et al. (2005), Watanabe and Harada (2006), Kim and Sheen (2006), Hillebrand
and Schnabl (2008) or Hoshikawa (2008) for Japan.
5According to these authors, this is due to: (i) the larger size of forex interventions relative to market
turnover in EMEs; (ii) the greater leverage of central banks in the case of existence of some form of
capital controls; (iii) the informational advantage that represents their lower level of sophistication.
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and run from fully discretionary interventions (Brazil, Peru) to intervention rules (Chile).
Introducing these features in the model specification could help to obtain additional in-
formation on the effect of interventions (Kim and Pham, 2006).
Besides, in this literature, the presence of asymmetries has not been much analyzed yet
(Baillie and Osterberg 1997, Domac¸ and Mendoza, 2004 or Guimara˜es and Karacadag,
2004). Forex interventions will have an asymmetric effect if sales of foreign currency
(negative interventions) have a different impact on the exchange rate volatility than that
of purchases (positive interventions). After the onset of the crisis, many central banks
performed interventions of opposite sign than those of the previous period (BIS, 2010),
which has allowed to increase the number of observations for the study of asymmetries.
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the efficiency of forex interventions
to influence on the exchange rate level and volatility of four Latin American countries
with inflation targets—namely, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru—. We focus on the
possible asymmetric effects of interventions, as well as their size and frequency. To
that purpose, we carry out a time series analysis for their daily bilateral exchange rates
against the USD, by fitting a battery of univariate GARCH type models. This type
of model has been broadly used in this literature since Baillie and Osterberg (1997) or
Dominguez (1998). Although GARCH models entail the aforementioned simultaneity
problems, this is a sensible procedure to deal with daily data.6 As far as we know, this is
the empirical paper that studies the efficiency of daily interventions for a greater number
of Latin American countries with an homogeneous model. Our results suggest that first
interventions, either isolated or initial in a rule, reduce the volatility, whereas their size
plays a minor role.
The paper is organized as follows. After the introduction, Section 2 briefly describes
the main transmission channels of sterilized interventions on the exchange rate. Then,
Section 3 describes the data set, which consists of the daily exchange rate returns and forex
6A GARCH type model is not the unique empirical approach proposed in this literature to analyze
the link between forex interventions and exchange rates. For instance, Neely (2008) summarizes the main
methodologies with particular emphasis in structural type models that simultaneously fit both variables.
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distinguishing the presence of asymmetries, as well as intervention characteristics such as
size and frequency. In Section 4, we report the main empirical findings. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
2 Transmission channels of forex interventions
Currently almost all countries, including our four Latin American economies, sterilize
their interventions through open market operations that eliminate their effect in the do-
mestic money supply. Thus, whereas non sterilized interventions immediately impact on
exchange rates through the monetary channel, sterilized intervention do not influence on
the exchange rate directly through the usual monetary mechanisms, but though indirect
channels. The lack of consensus in the empirical literature regarding the effectiveness
of forex interventions is precisely rooted on the indirect character of the transmission
channels of sterilized interventions. There are three main theoretical explanations for
intervention effectiveness that have been mostly studied from a theoretical point of view,
namely the signaling, the portfolio-balance and the international coordination channel
(Sarno and Taylor, 2001).
The signaling channel was first described in Mussa (1981). Forex interventions affect
the exchange rates through this mechanism when the central banks intervene to signal
their future monetary policy or the long-run equilibrium to the markets. Thus, when
market participants revise their expectations on these fundamentals, they simultaneously
adjust their prospects on future spot exchange rates, which has an impact on the current
exchange rate. That is, the information that the central bank provides through interven-
tions may lead investors modify to the exchange rate.7 In most signaling models there
is the implicit hypothesis that intervention signals are fully credible an unambiguous
(Dominguez, 1998).
On the other hand, in portfolio-balance exchange rate models investors diversify their
holdings among domestic and foreign currencies denominated bonds. As both assets are
imperfect substitutes, an sterilized intervention may induce investors to trade currencies
7Dominguez (1990) discuss the possible credibility games that implies the signaling channel.
interventions of our four countries. Then, Section 3 presents the GARCH models that will
be used to analyze the impact of interventions on the exchange rate level and volatility
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1226
to maintain their share of domestic and foreign assets, which will probably result in a
change in the exchange rate. Finally, Sarno and Taylor (2001) or Reitz and Taylor (2006)
also mention the international coordination channel, where interventions play a role in
the coordination of expectations by rational speculators.
Previous empirical studies are inconclusive with respect to the validity of these trans-
mission mechanisms of sterilized interventions (Edison, 1993). Nevertheless, as reported
in different surveys performed to policymakers, central bankers tend to believe in the effi-
cacy of the signaling and the coordination channel, whereas the portfolio-balance channel
hypothesis is not taken much into consideration (Lecourt and Raymond, 2006; Neely,
2008). See, for instance, Sarno and Taylor (2001) or Neely (2008), for further details on
the three transmission channels.
3 The data
We study the impact of interventions on the exchange rate level and volatility of four
currencies. In particular, we analyze the daily returns of the USD vis-a`-vis the Chilean
peso (CLP), the Colombian peso (COP), the Mexican peso (MXN) and the Peruvian
nuevo sol (PEN). That is, an increase (decrease) of the nominal bilateral exchange rate is
an appreciation (depreciation) of the local currency against the USD.8 Daily forex inter-
ventions were obtained from national sources.9 We only consider sales and purchases of
USD, as this is the most widely used currency to implement interventions in all countries.
See Appendix A for some description and data sources of forex intervention.10
Figure 1 represents the four currency pairs and the daily forex interventions (net forex
purchases or sales), where positive interventions indicate USD purchases and negative
values are official USD sales. In the years preceding the crisis, forex interventions in
8We have obtained all currency pairs from Datastream.
9Nowadays there is no comprehensive and updated database on daily forex interventions. Up to
our knowledge, the Federal Reserve Bank of Sant Louis provides the best data compilation, but it is
particularly focused on developed countries (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/32145).
10Forex interventions should be distinguished from those operations of central banks in the forex
market to manage official reserves or to meet transaction needs of the government (Chiu, 2003). Note
that with our database it is not possible to distinguish between both objectives.
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Chile, Colombia and Peru were more targeted to foreign exchange purchases rather than
sales, which reflects their appreciating trend in their role of commodity linked and high
yield currencies. On the contrary, the accumulation of reserves in Mexico prompted the
authorities to sell USD from 2003 (Guimara˜es and Karacadag, 2004). After the onset of
the crisis in 2008 all countries suffered depreciatory pressures and sold dollars.
As shown in Figure 1, the four countries represent a variety of intervention strategies.
Whereas in Peru the current policy is to intervene on a discretionary basis under excep-
tional circumstances the intervention strategy in Chile and Colombia is based on rules,
which imply more frequent and relatively smaller interventions. There are two types of
rules: Exchange rate-based rules, normally aimed at moderating the exchange rate volatil-
ity (Colombia), or quantity-based rules aimed at the accumulation of reserves (Chile).
Since February 2010 Mexico also holds this latter type of rule (Adler and Tovar, 2011).
According to Frankel and Dominguez (1993) interventions have a maximum impact when
they occur unexpectedly, which would support the effectiveness of isolated interventions,
but other authors conclude that the series of interventions might be perceived as more
credible to market participants (Kim et al., 2000).
Apart from representing a wide range of intervention strategies, we have chosen these
four currency pairs for other reasons. First and more importantly, their daily forex inter-
ventions are publicly available.11 Indeed, our country sample represents all the economies
that publish daily data, as reported in Adler and Tovar (2011), that meet certain prereq-
uisites. First, we explicitly exclude those countries that have not performed interventions
to influence on their own currencies after the onset of the last crisis, although they pub-
lish daily releases. This is the case of Canada, United Kingdom, the United States or
Turkey.12 Besides, their sample sizes should also be large enough for a GARCH type
analysis.13 For instance, we do not analyze Israel as the central bank has only intervened
11Data scarcity might justify the use of reserve variations as a proxy for intervention. However, daily
reserve variations are a bad approximation of forex interventions (Adler and Tovar, 2011).
12That is, coordinated interventions performed to modify the exchange rate of a different country are
not considered. Thus, the last forex intervention by Bank of Canada, the Federal Reserve and the Bank
of England was in March 2011 but it was a coordinated action to stabilize the JPY and not a direct
measure to stabilize its own currency. Finally, most recent intervention in Turkey was in 2006.
13For instance, if the sample of forex interventions is very small, their impact could be mislead with
that of an additive outlier, which can affect the identification of conditional heteroscedasticity and the
estimation of GARCH type models (Carnero et al., 2007).
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three times after 1997 (Sorezcky, 2010). Finally, we do not consider Australia as interven-
tions are published with a one year lag. All in all, we end up with a representative sample
of Latin American countries, where our four economies are among the seven largest in
the region in terms of GDP based on PPP valuation.14
Table 1 reports the exchange rate regime and monetary policy arrangement of the four
countries, which can influence the impact of interventions (Disyatat, 2007). According to
IMF’s classification, all countries but Colombia and Peru, which follow a managed floating
regime with no pre-determined path for the exchange rate, have floating currencies and all
countries follow an inflation target. Note that even though the four EMEs have adopted
inflation targets during the last years, so that in theory the exchange rate plays no role as
nominal anchor, these economies intervene actively in the forex markets (Berganza and
Broto, 2012).15 The sample period varies across countries and runs from 31/7/1996 to
6/6/2011 for the USD/MXN (T = 3873) to 1/1/2004 to 15/6/2011 in the case of the CLP
(T = 1944). The beginning of the sample period indicates the first official publication
date of forex interventions.
Table 1 also shows some descriptive statistics for total interventions, It, as well as
for negative and positive interventions, denoted as I−t and I
+
t , respectively. Note that
negative interventions, I−t , indicate sales of USD and are typically performed under depre-
ciatory pressures, while I+t stand for USD purchases, which are characteristic of periods
of appreciatory pressures of the local currency. Whereas the central bank of Colombia has
intervened around 19% of the trading days during the sample period, the Central Reserve
Bank of Peru intervened around 61% of the days. In general, net sales of USD are much
less frequent than net purchases. For instance, they represent 7% of total interventions
in Colombia, whereas Mexico is the only country where negative interventions are more
frequent than positive ones (89%).
14According to the World Economic Outlook Database of the IMF (September 2011).
15Whereas Chile and Colombia adopted and inflation target in 1999, Mexico introduced this monetary
policy framework in 2001 and Peru in 2002 (IMF, 2005).
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total interventions, It, and for I
+
t and I
−
t . All these series are asymmetric and have excess
kurtosis. The skewness of all exchange rate returns is negative. That is, extreme values of
returns are related to currency depreciation. Box-Pierce Q-statistics for higher order serial
correlation reveal that squared returns are much more autocorrelated than non-squared
data, which implies the presence of conditional heteroscedasticity in all exchange rate
returns and evidences the suitability of a GARCH type model in this setting. Regarding
forex interventions, as illustrated in Table 2, in Colombia the average absolute value of
negative interventions is larger than that of positive interventions, whereas in Mexico the
opposite holds. In Chile, positive and negative interventions have a similar volume, which
is inherent to the design of its intervention rule. Besides, I+t and I
−
t are also asymmetric
and have excess kurtosis,16 where the absolute value of the skewness coefficient of I−t is
larger than that of I+t in Mexico and Chile. That is, extreme events of the distribution
of interventions tend to be associated with USD sales.
4 Empirical model
We model the percent returns of the nominal exchange rate of the USD against the four
currencies, which are represented in Figure 2 and are given by,
rt = 100× (Δ logEt) (1)
where Et is the bilateral nominal exchange rate in t and Δ is the difference operator so
that a positive rt denotes a local currency appreciation against the USD.
17
Our baseline model is a simplified version of that proposed by Dominguez (1998) to
analyze forex interventions and exchange rate volatility in the G3, which follows this
expression,
rt = β0 + β1rt−1 + β2It−1 + εt (2)
εt = ε
†
th
1/2
t (3)
ht = α0 + α1ε
2
t−1 + α2ht−1 + γ1 |It−1| (4)
16Note that these statistics cannot be calculated for I+t in Chile, as it is constant for the whole period.
17We subtract the mean of Δ logEt to guarantee zero mean returns (Harvey et al., 1994).
Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics for the four exchange rate returns, rt, for
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where, ∀t = 1, ..., T , rt are the daily exchange rate returns, |It−1| is the absolute value
of lagged forex interventions and ε†t is a Gaussian white noise process. As Dominguez
(1998) or Hoshikawa (2008), we introduce interventions in the mean and in the conditional
variance, where |It−1| should appear in absolute value to guarantee its positivity. In (2)
we also add rt−1 for pre-whitening purposes, as usual in the empirical finance literature.
For the sake of simplicity, we omit any additional explanatory variables in the model.18
Note that forex interventions are lagged to circumvent simultaneous bias, in line with
Baillie and Osternberg (1997), among others. Thus, as rt is the return on the exchange
rate between the closing day (t − 1) and t, interventions in (t − 1), It−1, which occur
during the business operating hours (Neely, 2000), are predetermined. As mentioned, all
methodologies in this literature, have to deal with the simultaneity between the interven-
tions and the exchange rate returns. This fact constitutes an endogeneity issue inherent
to this problem. Indeed, assuming that interventions are exogenous to market conditions
would be rather strong taking into account that monetary authorities explicitly declare
that they intervene to calm disorderly markets (Dominguez, 1998; Kim and Sheen, 2002;
Frenkel et al., 2005). As noted by Kim and Pham (2006) one possible solution to this
problem lies precisely in the own data selection by lagging interventions, as we propose.
Another alternative would be to use high-frequency intra daily data, but the specific time
of intervention is not available.19
A negative (positive) coefficient of the interventions in (2), β2, will indicate that a
net purchase of foreign currency is followed by a depreciation (appreciation) of the local
currency. Note that a positive estimate of β2 could imply that interventions have not
influenced rt in the desired way, as USD purchases would be associated with a local
currency appreciation. However, this outcome is consistent with a ‘leaning against the
18Some authors such as Dominguez (1998) use interest rate spreads to control for the monetary policy
stance. Our preliminary results including interest rate differentials do not vary significantly, so that
in line with Edison et al. (2006), Beine et al. (2009) or Hoshikawa (2008) we do not consider this
variable. In the mean equation we do not consider either day of the week and holiday dummy variables
for simplicity. These last variables would lead to degenerated likelihood surfaces if they are included in
the conditional variance (Doornik and Ooms, 2003).
19See Kim and Pham (2006) for further analysis on endogeneity in this literature.
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wind’ strategy, which is also linked with the aforementioned endogeneity issues, as the
central bank buys dollars as a response to the appreciatory pressures on their currency.
In this sense, forex interventions are helping to moderate the previous exchange rate
trend.20 On the other hand, the estimates of γ1 in (4) would be negative if the exchange
rate volatility moderates after the forex intervention.21
We also estimate a modified version of this baseline model modifying the conditional
variance (4) to incorporate asymmetries.22 This allows us to analyze if interventions
to stabilize the currency under depreciatory or appreciatory pressures have a different
impact on the exchange rate volatility. For this purpose we substitute the conditional
variance in (4) with this expression,
ht = α0 + α1ε
2
t−1 + α2ht−1 + γ2
∣
∣I−t−1
∣
∣ + γ3I
+
t−1, (5)
where
∣
∣I −t
∣
∣ and I+t stand for |It|. The effect of negative interventions on the exchange
rate returns is γ2 whereas that of positive interventions is γ3. This conditional variance
equation in (5) also allows to perform Wald-type tests for the null that interventions have
a symmetric effect on the conditional variance, H0 : γ2 = γ3.
In a third stage we analyze if considering some characteristics of forex interventions
is useful to disentangle their link with the exchange rate volatility. With this purpose we
use the following specification,
rt = β0 + β1rt−1 + (β2 + β3FIRSTt−1 + β4SIZEt−1)It−1 + εt (6)
εt = ε
†
th
1/2
t (7)
ht = α0 + α1ε
2
t−1 + α2ht−1 + (γ1 + γ4FIRSTt−1 + γ5SIZEt−1) |It−1| (8)
20Humpage (2000) denotes this forex intervention objective as the smoothing criterion, as it is based
on smoothing previous trend.
21In the estimation process we have imposed positivity constraints on ht to avoid negative variances
resulting from these negative coefficients.
22We do not consider asymmetries in the mean equation to distinguish the effect of positive and
negative forex interventions in the exchange rate returns. Our preliminary exercises, which are available
upon request, show that this asymmetry is hardly significant in our data.
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or an isolated intervention, that is, if It−1 = 0 and It = 0, and zero otherwise.23 As in
Kim and Shenn (2006) and Kim and Pham (2006), SIZEt is a dummy variable that is
one if the absolute value of It is greater than the average daily absolute interventions.
Note that FIRSTt and SIZEt can be highly correlated, as isolated interventions use to
be bigger than consecutive interventions.24
Finally, we perform some statistical inference on the presence of asymmetries in the
conditional variance equation (8) by also considering this alternative specification,
ht = α0 + α1ε
2
t−1 + α2ht−1 + (9)
(γ2 + γ6FIRSTt−1 + γ7SIZEt−1)
∣
∣I−t−1
∣
∣ + (γ3 + γ8FIRSTt−1 + γ9SIZEt−1)I+t−1,
which also allows to test for the presence of asymmetries depending on the size and the
systematic character of interventions. For instance, a test of the null hypothesis that large
and first interventions, either isolated or first in a row, are symmetric is H0 : γ2+γ6+γ7 =
γ3 + γ8 + γ9.
5 Main results
5.1 Baseline model
Table 3 reports the estimates of the baseline model in equations from (2) to (4) for the
USD against the four currencies.
Regarding the level equation, the estimated coefficient of the forex interventions, βˆ2,
is only significant for Colombia and it is positive, which indicates that USD purchases
by the Colombian central bank are related to an appreciation of the COP. The most
feasible interpretation of this positive sign for βˆ2, as highlighted by Edison et al. (2006)
for Australia, is that these interventions are consistent with a ‘leaning against the wind’
behavior, in that its net purchases (sales) of foreign assets coincided with an appreciation
where FIRSTt is a dummy variable that is one if It is the first intervention in a series
23In a complementary way, Kim and Sheen (2006) have analyzed intervention effectiveness if they
persist over a number of days.
24The correlation between FIRSTt and SIZEt in our sample run from 0.01 in Peru to 0.64 in Colombia.
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of forex interventions to alter the exchange rate.25 Finally, as expected, βˆ1 is significant
but small or not significant.
As reported in Table 3, the GARCH estimates αˆ0, αˆ1 and αˆ2 of the conditional
variance equation in (4) are positive and significant. As usual in empirical applications,
(αˆ1 + αˆ2), which approximates volatility persistence, is close to unity. This indicates
that once volatility is high, the exchange rate volatility remains high for a long period.
The estimates of the absolute value of interventions, γˆ1, exhibit a variety of results. On
the one hand, they are positive and significant for Chile and Colombia, so that forex
interventions would be associated with even greater exchange rate volatility, in line with
Edison et al. (2006). This positive sign indicates that in the periods of forex interventions
(either USD purchases or sales) the exchange rate volatility increases. The interpretation
of this sign can be ambiguous rooted on the already mentioned causality issues. Again,
one possible interpretation is that forex interventions add uncertainty to the market but,
on the other hand, it can be interpreted that forex interventions simply coincide with
periods of higher uncertainty, which is precisely the reason to intervene. On the other
hand, γˆ1 is negative and significant for Peru, meaning that interventions are linked to a
lower contemporaneous volatility, and not significant for Mexico. Finally, in general Box-
Pierce statistics for high-order serial correlation of the squared standardized residuals in
Table 3 support the role of these GARCH models to capture the dynamics of the exchange
rate conditional variance.26
Nevertheless, as intervention policy changes throughout time, the impact of inter-
ventions on the exchange rate could have varied during the sample period as well, as
25Following the classification of Humpage (2000), there are two criteria to characterize the success
of a forex intervention: the direction criterion and the smoothing criterion. The direction criterion
would fulfill if interventions manage to change the exchange rate direction (for instance, USD purchases
depreciate de local currency), which would lead to a positive βˆ2. On the other hand, the smoothing
criterion seeks to moderate the current currency trend. This would be in line with the ‘leaning against
the wind’ behavior and would be linked with a positive βˆ2.
26Note that Q(20) in Table 3 is still significant for all countries but Mexico, whereas Q2(20) for Peru still
indicates the presence of certain dynamics in the conditional variance. This outcome is a consequence of
fitting a unique model for all countries. However, these Ljung-Box Q-statistic will become non significant
in some of the following model specifications.
(depreciation) of the local currencies so that both variables are positively correlated. The
fact that βˆ2 is not significant for Chile, Mexico and Peru evidences certain lack of success
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illustrated in Figure 3. This figure shows the t-statistics of γˆ1 for the four countries ob-
tained with a rolling window of 1500 observations for Colombia, Mexico and Peru and
750 for Chile. As shown by these statistics, whereas in Chile interventions tend to have a
moderating effect on volatility, the opposite holds for Colombia. In Mexico and Peru γˆ1
helped to moderate volatility at certain subperiods previous to the onset of the crisis.27
All in all, the estimates for the baseline model could seem rather ambiguous regarding
the effect of forex interventions on the exchange rate level and volatility. In the next
subsections the introduction of asymmetries and intervention characteristics in the model
specifications will allow to disentangle further conclusions.
5.2 Capturing asymmetric effects in the conditional variance
In Table 4 we model asymmetric effects in the conditional variance to differentiate USD
sales from purchases through the estimates of γˆ2 and γˆ3, respectively, in (5). Indeed, once
we fit the model we perform Wald type test for the null H0 : γ2 = γ3 to distinguish if
positive and negative interventions have a significantly different impact on the conditional
variances. We reject this hypothesis for Colombia, Mexico and Peru, whereas for Chile
we cannot reject the null of symmetry. This result constitutes a first evidence of the
importance of fitting asymmetries in this setting. On the other hand, the symmetric
impact identified for the Chilean interventions seems a rather sensible result given their
intervention rule scheme based on preannounced purchases or sales of USD of the same
magnitude.
As reported in Table 4, in Chile the effects of interventions on the conditional volatility
are mainly driven by USD sales (negative interventions), where γˆ2 has a positive sign.
On the contrary, in Colombia the positive interventions (USD purchases) dominate the
total effect of interventions leading to higher volatility. However, negative interventions
(USD sales) do stabilize the COP, as indicated by the negative γˆ3, although the effect of
27In the remaining subsections we do not show the estimates of the rolling regressions due to identifi-
cation problems for some countries. Thus, if a country has not performed interventions of a certain sign
or FIRSTt = 0 or SIZEt = 0 for a prolonged period the model cannot be estimated. The complete
battery of figures for the rolling regressions are available upon request.
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positive interventions seem to prevail. In Mexico and Peru both USD purchases and sales
do moderate the exchange rate volatility. Thus, after fitting the asymmetric conditional
variance, both positive and negative interventions are associated with lower exchange
rate volatility, which is contrary to Guimara˜es and Karacadag (2004) and Domac¸ and
Mendoza (2004) for Mexico.28 In both countries USD purchases have a slightly higher
effect than that of sales (in absolute value).
5.3 The role of forex intervention characteristics
Table 5 reports the estimates for the model in equations from (6) to (8), which incorporate
the variables FIRSTt and SIZEt to analyze if the characteristics of forex interventions
do affect the exchange rate level and volatility. In Mexico first and sizeable interventions
would be consistent with a ‘leaning against the wind’ role of the central bank, which is
also the case of the first interventions of the Chilean rule—as evidenced by the positive
and significant βˆ3 and βˆ4—. These results are in line with previous works for developed
countries.29 On the contrary, the lack of significance of βˆ3 and βˆ4 in Colombia and Peru
indicates that it is not relevant to consider FIRSTt and SIZEt in their level equation.
The estimates of the conditional variance in (8) also highlight the importance of
including FIRSTt and SIZEt in the estimation process. For instance, first interventions
lead to a lower conditional variance of the Mexican and Colombian peso, whereas in Peru
the negative γˆ1 and the positive γˆ5 indicate that small and “not first” interventions are
followed by lower conditional variances.
Finally, Table 6 reports the conditional variance estimates of (10), where previous
model is augmented distinguishing a different effect of positive and negative interventions.
28Guimara˜es and Karacadag (2004) conclude that USD sales have an small impact on the USD/MXN
level, which would be in line with our results, and that these negative interventions increase its volatility.
Domac¸ and Mendoza (2004) also identity a moderating effect of USD sales, but not for the purchases.
These divergences with our outcomes can be rooted on their different treatment of endogeneity, their
model specification and their sample period.
29For instance, Kim et al. (2000) and Kim and Pham (2006) conclude that large interventions in
Australia have been effective in controlling the exchange rate level, whereas Hoshikawa (2008) conclude
that low frequency and officially announced interventions in Japan mainly affect the exchange rate level.
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In line with our previous results, Wald type tests for different null hypothesis show
that introducing asymmetries is relevant to improve the model specification as the null
of symmetry is rejected in all countries but Chile. Thus, modeling asymmetries and
intervention characteristics seems useful to disentangle further conclusions.
For instance, in Mexico, not all first interventions are helpful to lower the conditional
variance. Indeed, only negative first interventions play this moderating role, as shown
by the estimates of γ6. Note that the size of USD sales is related to higher exchange
rate volatility, whereas small negative interventions, either first or not, do have an effect
while representing 83% of total interventions. Of these USD sales, first interventions
were mostly preannounced, so that this result might hint at the signaling role of these
interventions throughout the sample period, which supports the stabilizing function of
intervention rules in Mexico. Our result would be contrary to Guimara˜es and Karacadag
(2004), who stated that negative interventions increase the MXN short term volatility.30
Finally, positive interventions in Mexico were mostly performed to accumulate foreign
reserves and not as a tool to directly influence on the exchange rate, which could explain
the lack of significance of the coefficients for positive interventions, I+t .
This signaling effect of interventions seems to be also the case of the Chilean peso,
where first and positive interventions lead to lower exchange rate volatility, as evidenced
by the negative and significant γˆ8. That is, once the intervention rule to buy USD is
announced by the authorities, it has an immediate effect on the volatility, this initial
impact vanishes in the subsequent interventions, as shown by the lack of significance of
γˆ3. The significance of first interventions emphasizes the success of transparency and
public announcements to moderate volatility, although these effects seem to have a short
term impact that coincides with the announcement of the intervention rule.
In Colombia first interventions are also relevant, but in this case both USD purchases
and sales do moderate COP volatility, as shown by the negative and significant γˆ6 and
γˆ8.
31 Colombia is the only country of our sample where the intervention size does help
to moderate the exchange rate volatility, but only for sizeable USD sales, as indicated
30Our result is in line with Domac¸ and Mendoza (2004), although they did not characterized size and
frequency of interventions.
31In Colombia, first interventions correspond to 19% of total interventions.
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by γˆ7. In Peru, that currently intervenes in a discretionary way, first interventions also
curb volatility, but only USD purchases, as shown by the estimate for γ8. Finally, small
negative interventions, which characterize 33% of interventions, are also associated with
lower exchange rate volatility, as γˆ2 evidences.
All in all, although apparently it seems difficult to infer empirical regularities across
the four countries, there is certain homogeneity regarding those intervention character-
istics that matter to diminish volatility. For instance, in the four economies first inter-
ventions, either positive or negative, play a role to curb the conditional variance. That
is, the estimates for FIRSTt, either γˆ6 and/or γˆ8, are significant and negative in the
four countries. This moderating effect of first intervention is independent of the exchange
rate regime, as these economies have either recently implemented an intervention rule—
namely, Chile, Colombia and Mexico—, either exchange rate-based or quantity based, or
intervene in a discretionary way. On the other hand, the intervention size seems to be
less relevant to calm volatility, as the estimates for SIZEt, (γˆ7 or γˆ9), are not significant
or positive for almost any country.32
As our four countries are inflation targeters, so that the exchange rate is not their
nominal anchor, these results indicate that first interventions, either isolated or first in
a row, represent a signal to the markets calming their expectations and reducing their
exchange rate volatility. This signaling effect happens regardless of the intervention size.
In some sense, this result could be related with the signaling channel of sterilized inter-
ventions. This finding is possibly linked to the credibility of the own inflation targeting
framework. Indeed, given the credibility of the monetary regime, the transparency of
the intervention announces in the case of adopting an intervention rule would probably
contribute to their favorable effect on volatility. This outcome is in line with other pa-
pers that defend the selective and transparent use of forex interventions under inflation
targeting regimes.33
32This last result is contrary to the findings for some developed countries such as Australia. For
instance, Kim et al. (2000) and Kim and Pham (2006) state that sustained and large interventions do
moderate volatility.
33See for instance Berganza and Broto (2012) or Ostry et al. (2012).
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6 Conclusions
Although many central banks actively intervene in the forex market, there is still no
consensus on their efficiency to influence on the exchange rate level and to moderate
its volatility. In this paper we use daily data of the USD against four Latin American
currencies (namely, the CLP, COP, MXN and PEN) to analyze the impact of forex
interventions of central banks on their currency returns. These four economies are among
the few that publish their daily forex interventions and that have also intervened in the
forex markets in the last years. We analyze if the intervention sign, which is positive
or negative if there are USD purchases or sales, does make a deal to disentangle the
effect of interventions on the exchange rate dynamics. We also study the role of certain
intervention characteristics. Namely, we study their size and the fact or being an isolated
interventions or the first intervention in a row. To this purpose, we fit several univariate
GARCH models that provide new evidence on the asymmetric effects of interventions on
the exchange rate volatility.
Our results indicate that forex interventions in Latin America have an asymmetric
effect, specially in the conditional variance. However, there is no homogeneous pattern
across countries regarding which type of interventions—positive (purchases of USD) or
negative (sales of USD)—dominate the exchange rate volatility dynamics and help to
stabilize it. For instance, whereas in Peru dollar purchases helped to moderate volatility,
in Colombia they lead to higher volatility. Nevertheless, distinguishing the intervention
sign in the model becomes a useful tool to analyze which intervention characteristics
succeed to curb volatility.
Thus, once asymmetries are introduced in the conditional variance specification it
is easier to disentangle which interventions, in terms of frequency and size, do impact
on the exchange rate level and volatility in the desired direction. Again, it is difficult
to establish regularities across the four countries but one clear pattern emerges from
our results: the intervention size plays a minor role to influence on the exchange rate.
That is, sizeable interventions have no greater influence on the exchange rate than small
interventions. On the contrary, first in a row or isolated interventions are helpful to curb
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so that in principle their exchange rate is fully flexible, this result might indicate that
initial or one-off interventions do send a signal to the markets, regardless the their size,
which becomes useful to reduce their currency volatility. This outcome could be linked
to the credibility of their inflation targeting regime.
These results are important for central banks to asses on the effect of forex interven-
tions. However, this analysis still lacks other relevant elements such as the generalization
of the model to include other characteristics of forex interventions, such as persistence,
or further control variables in the level equation, such as the degree of exchange rate
misalignment or a measure of carry-trade attractiveness, like the carry-to-risk, that can
be relevant in the case of high yielding commodity linked currencies like ours. We leave
these extensions for future research.
the currency volatility in the four countries. As these economies are inflation targeters,
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Appendix: Forex intervention data sources
Chile
• Source: Banco Central de Chile (http://www.bcentral.cl/estadisticas-economicas/series-
indicadores/index db.htm).
• Notes: During the sample period, consistently with its foreign exchange policy since
Chile adopted an inflation target in 1999, the central bank implemented intervention
rules in several occasions but only under exceptional circumstances. From April 2008 to
September 2008 the central bank daily purchased 50 million USD to accumulate 8 billion
USD to increase the foreign reserves under increasing uncertainty. However, this program
was suspended before completion in September 2008. From March 2009 to November
2009 the Treasury sold USD on a daily basis. Finally, on January 2011 the central bank
announced to buy 12 billion USD in reserves throughout 2011 through daily purchases of
50 million USD.
• Source: Banco de la Repu´blica de Colombia (http://www.banrep.gov.co/series-estadisticas/
see s externo 2.htm#banda).
• Notes: From November 1999 to October 2009, after the inflation targeting adoption in
September 1999, the authorities followed an exchange rate based rule which allowed the
possibility to intervene in the forex market by auctions (put or call). The aim of these
interventions was to increase or decrease the level of international reserves and to control
the exchange rate volatility. Most interventions in that period consisted in auctions in
put options to accumulate reserves, but the central bank also announced occasionally call
options for reserve disaccumulation. To control for the exchange rate volatility, each time
the COP depreciated (appreciated) more than 4% below (above) the average exchange
rate of the previous 20 days, volatility auctions were held to sell put (call) options. Since
then, this program has been replaced by a direct intervention mechanism consisting on
the purchase of at least 20 million USD a day. Fully discretionary interventions are not
included in our sample as they are not publicly available.
Colombia
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• Source: Banco de Mexico (http://www.banxico.org.mx/sistema-financiero/estadisticas/
mercado-cambiario/operaciones-vigentes-del-banc.html).
• Notes: From 1996 to June 2001 the Mexican authorities intervened 14 times in a discre-
tionary way while they frequently purchased USD through put options’ auctions. From
May 2003 to July 2008, a significant reserve accumulation led the authorities to sell USD
to the market in a preannounced volume (see Guimara˜es and Karacadag, 2004). From
October 2008, to alleviate the depreciatory pressures and high volatility of the MXN af-
ter the onset of the crisis, Banco de Mexico performed several discretionary interventions
based on extraordinary USD auctions whenever the MXN depreciated more than 2%.
From March 2009, this mechanism was combined with USD auctions without a minimum
price. Finally, on February 2010 it was announced a put options mechanism to build forex
reserves, in a similar way to that of the period from 1996 to 2001. This last mechanism
was suspended in November 2011.
Peru
• Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru (http://estadisticas.bcrp.gob.pe/index.asp?sIdioma=1
&sTitulo=OPERACIONES%20CAMBIARIAS%20BCRP%20(mill.%20US$)&sFrecuencia=D).
• Notes: The Central Reserve Bank of Peru classifies their forex operations in four broad
categories (namely, over the counter purchases and sales, net swap operations, certificates
of deposit in USD and operations with the public sector). These mechanisms were mixed
throughout the sample period.
Mexico
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Figure 1: Daily bilateral exchange rates against the dollar and forex interventions in
Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
Table 1: Data description
Country Exchange Rate Arrangement Monetary Policy Framework Sample period It (% on total) I
−
t (% on It) I
+
t (% on It)
Chile Independently floating Inflation targeting 01/01/2004-15/06/2011 21 41 59
Colombia Managed floating Inflation targeting 03/01/2000-30/06/2011 19 7 93
Mexico Independently floating Inflation targeting 31/07/1996-06/06/2011 42 89 11
Peru Managed floating Inflation targeting 01/02/2000-03/06/2011 61 34 66
Notes: Intervention data obtained from national sources. The exchange rate regime follows the de facto
classification of exchange rate regimes and monetary policy frameworks of IMF (2009). Colombia and
Peru have a managed floating regime with no pre-determined path for the exchange rate.
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Figure 2: Daily returns of the US dollar against the Chilean peso (CLP), the Colombian
peso (COP), the Mexican peso (MXN) and the Peruvian nuevo sol (PEN).
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Figure 3: Rolling baseline model, equations (2) to (4); t-statistics for γˆ1. Rolling window
of 1500 observations for Colombia, Mexico and Peru and 750 observations for Chile.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of daily exchange rate returns and forex interventions.
Chile Colombia
rt It I
−
t I
+
t rt It I
−
t I
+
t
Mean 0.0120 11.3647 −43.7951 50.000 0.0019 18.4288 −68.1748 24.8378
SD 0.6885 46.3264 4.8673 0 0.6899 37.9296 61.3347 26.0057
Maximum 3.5972 50.000 −40.000 50.000 4.6754 200.000 −1.000 200.000
Minimun −4.6574 −50.000 −50.000 50.000 −4.8712 −199.900 −199.900 0.500
Skewness −0.4300∗∗∗ −0.3719∗∗∗ −0.4965∗∗∗ −0.4054∗∗∗ −0.7768∗∗∗ −0.6844 4.0564∗∗∗
Kurtosis 7.3539∗∗∗ 1.1577∗∗∗ 1.2465∗∗∗ 11.6327∗∗∗ 15.5041∗∗∗ 2.2286∗∗∗ 21.6638∗∗∗
Observations 1944 403 166 237 2998 566 39 527
Q(20) 61.173∗∗∗ 52.941∗∗∗
Q2(20) 953.01∗∗∗ 1665.5∗∗∗
Mexico Peru
rt It I
−
t I
+
t rt It I
−
t I
+
t
Mean −0.0111 −27.1721 −43.7217 110.1429 0.0077 11.5776 −33.2135 33.5443
SD 0.6966 187.845 188.6894 107.6463 0.3325 83.2301 105.7776 58.1132
Maximum 7.4085 592.000 −6.000 592.000 3.3218 493.5 −9.75E − 04 493.5
Minimun −8.7164 −6400.000 −6400.000 2.000 −3.2174 −1898.606 −1898.606 3.7E − 05
Skewness −1.0833∗∗∗ −25.0712∗∗∗ −27.6280∗∗∗ 1.7874∗∗∗ −0.1517∗∗∗ −7.4751∗∗∗ −11.1517∗∗∗ 2.9867∗∗∗
Kurtosis 22.9544∗∗∗ 825.2344∗∗∗ 898.2819∗∗∗ 7.0584∗∗∗ 18.7094∗∗∗ 170.6581∗∗∗ 175.6535∗∗∗ 13.8622∗∗∗
Observations 3873 1627 1452 175 2958 1790 589 1201
Q(20) 80.344∗∗∗ 110.77∗∗∗
Q2(20) 2055.5∗∗∗ 631.77∗∗∗
Notes: rt are the exchange rate returns. Forex interventions, It, expressed in million USD. I−t stands
for negative forex interventions whereas I+t are positive forex interventions Q(20) is the Ljung-Box Q-
statistic (with 20 lags) for the exchange rate returns and Q2(20) is the Ljung-Box Q-statistic (with 20
lags) for the squared returns.
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Table 3: Estimates of the baseline model for the exchange rate returns of four Latin
American countries.
Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
β0 0.0200 0.0090 0.0161
∗∗∗ 0.0083
(0.0123) (0.0070) (0.0077) (0.0157)
β1 0.0769
∗∗∗ 0.0539∗∗ −0.0699∗∗∗ −0.1470∗∗∗
(0.0258) (0.0198) (0.0178) (0.0372)
β2 −0.0007 0.0012∗∗∗ −7.41E − 05 0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001)
α0 0.0148
∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0966∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0004) (0.0017) (0.0057)
α1 0.1108
∗∗∗ 0.1632∗∗∗ 0.2135∗∗∗ 0.1370∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0084) (0.0067) (0.0183)
α2 0.8541
∗∗∗ 0.8425∗∗∗ 0.7623∗∗∗ 0.5641∗∗∗
(0.0149) (0.0069) (0.0081) (0.0266)
γ1 0.0002
∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ −6.54E − 05 −0.0001∗∗∗
(9.31E − 05) (8.88E − 05) (4.59E − 05) (4.22E − 05)
LogL −1798.384 −2348.878 −3259.688 −1213.151
Q(20) 32.637∗∗ 42.025∗∗∗ 20.077 42.912∗∗∗
Q2(20) 3.3481 15.468 16.960 87.970∗∗∗
Note: Estimation results of the exchange rate GARCH model:
rt = β0 + β1rt−1 + β2It−1 + εt
εt = ε
†
th
1/2
t
ht = α0 + α1ε2t−1 + α2ht−1 + γ1 |It−1|
See Tables 1 and 2 for the sample size and period of each country; Dependent variable: Exchange
rate returns (log difference of US dollar / local currency) ; LogL denotes the value of the log likelihood
function; Q(20) denotes the Ljung-Box Q-statistic (with 20 lags) for the standardized residuals; Q2(20)
denotes the Ljung-Box Q-statistic (with 20 lags) for the squared standardized residuals. Standard errors
in brackets; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ refer to significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 38 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1226
Table 4: Estimates of the model with asymmetries in the conditional variance for the
exchange rate returns of four Latin American countries.
Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
α0 0.0142
∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.2971∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0004) (0.0164) (4.01E − 05)
α1 0.1094
∗∗∗ 0.1595∗∗∗ 0.2465∗∗∗ 0.1812∗∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0084) (0.0199) (0.0092)
α2 0.8564
∗∗∗ 0.8391∗∗∗ 0.4394∗∗∗ 0.7771∗∗∗
(0.0147) (0.0069) (0.0248) (0.0034)
γ2 0.0003
∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0008∗∗∗ −6.12E − 06∗
(0.0001) (5.78E − 05) (0.0001) (4.09E − 06)
γ3 0.0003 0.0006
∗∗∗ −0.0010∗∗∗ −1.32E − 05∗∗∗
(0.0001) (9.12E − 05) (2.96E − 05) (8.71E − 07)
H0 : γ2 = γ3 0.4201 0.000
∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.0791∗
LogL −1798.164 −2346.522 −3800.268 167.7634
Q(20) 32.460∗∗ 43.874∗∗∗ 26.146 25.949
Q2(20) 3.3210 14.604 413.69∗∗∗ 8.0412
Note: Estimation results of the exchange rate GARCH model:
rt = β0 + β1rt−1 + β2It−1 + εt
εt = ε
†
th
1/2
t
ht = α0 + α1ε2t−1 + α2ht−1 + γ2
∣
∣I−t−1
∣
∣ + γ3I+t−1
See Tables 1 and 2 for the sample size and period of each country; Dependent variable: Exchange
rate returns (log difference of US dollar / local currency) ; LogL denotes the value of the log likelihood
function; Q(20) denotes the Ljung-Box Q-statistic (with 20 lags) for the standardized residuals; Q2(20)
denotes the Ljung-Box Q-statistic (with 20 lags) for the squared standardized residuals. Standard errors
in brackets. H0 : γ2 = γ3 indicates the p-value of the Wald type test of this linear restriction. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ refer to significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Table 5: Estimates of the baseline model for the exchange rate returns of four Latin
American countries.
Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
β0 0.0210 0.0072 0.0197
∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗
(0.0122) (0.00704) (0.0091) (0.0032)
β1 0.0789
∗∗∗ 0.05571∗∗∗ −0.0716∗∗∗ −0.0700∗∗∗
(0.0260) (0.0199) (0.0183) (0.0206)
β2 −0.0008 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0006) (0.0017) (0.0005) (0.0002)
β3 0.0212
∗∗∗ 0.0012 0.0009∗∗ −2.89E − 05
(0.0062) (0.0021) (0.0003) (0.0001)
β4 −0.0023 0.0011∗ 0.0004
(0.0023) (0.0006) (0.0003)
α0 0.0165
∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0233∗∗∗ 0.0052∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0004) (0.0020) (0.0001)
α1 0.1233
∗∗∗ 0.1614∗∗∗ 0.2219∗∗∗ 0.3359∗∗∗
(0.0149) (0.0096) (0.0074) (0.0160)
α2 0.8377
∗∗∗ 0.8264∗∗∗ 0.7498∗∗∗ 0.6527∗∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0076) (0.0092) (0.0068)
γ1 0.0002
∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ −0.0001∗ −0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (7.03E − 05) (1.42E − 06)
γ4 −0.0035 −0.0023∗∗∗ −0.0003∗ 3.93E − 05
(0.0050) (0.0007) (0.0002) (2.44E − 05)
γ5 0.0010 0.0002
∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0001) (4.98E − 06)
LogL −1795.734 −2337.907 −3254.456 −62.5194
Q(20) 32.325∗∗ 45.212∗∗∗ 20.019 27.053
Q2(20) 3.2387 14.375 16.819 6.2967
Note: Estimation results of the exchange rate GARCH model:
rt = β0 + β1rt−1 + (β2 + β3FIRSTt−1 + β4SIZEt−1)It−1 + εt
εt = ε
†
th
1/2
t
ht = α0 + α1ε2t−1 + α2ht−1 + (γ1 + γ4FIRSTt−1 + γ5SIZEt−1) |It−1|
See Tables 1 and 2 for the sample size and period of each country; Dependent variable: Exchange
rate returns (log difference of US dollar / local currency) ; LogL denotes the value of the log likelihood
function; Q(20) denotes the Ljung-Box Q-statistic (with 20 lags) for the standardized residuals; Q2(20)
denotes the Ljung-Box Q-statistic (with 20 lags) for the squared standardized residuals. Standard errors
in brackets. FIRSTt is a dummy variable that is one if FIRSTt−1 = 0 and FIRSTt = 0, and cero
otherwise. SIZEt is a dummy variable that is one if |It| is bigger than the average forex intervention.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ refer to significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Table 6: Estimates of the asymmetric model for the exchange rate returns of four Latin
American countries.
Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
α0 0.0154
∗∗∗ 0.0062∗∗∗ 0.3857∗∗∗ 0.0989∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0006) (0.0371) (0.0201)
α1 0.1186
∗∗∗ 0.2041∗∗∗ 0.0901∗∗∗ 0.1361∗∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0109) (0.0151) (0.0280)
α2 0.8453
∗∗∗ 0.7916∗∗∗ 0.5428∗∗∗ 0.5697∗∗∗
(0.0154) (0.0083) (0.0418) (0.0841)
γ2 0.0003
∗∗ 0.0190∗∗∗ −0.0065∗∗∗ −0.0018∗
(0.0001) (0.0047) (0.0006) (0.0009)
γ3 0.0001 0.0023
∗∗∗ −0.0005 −0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0046) (0.0008)
γ6 −0.0028 −0.0071∗ −0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0002
(0.0066) (0.0041) (0.0012) (0.0003)
γ7 −0.0124∗∗ 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0016∗
(0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0009)
γ8 −0.0087∗ −0.0032∗∗∗ −0.0005 −0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0092) (0.0008) (0.0006) (6.70E − 05)
γ9 0.0008 −0.0004 −9.93E − 05
(0.0009) (0.0046) (0.0008)
H0 : γ2 = γ3 0.3921 0.0004
∗∗∗ 0.1690 0.1632
H0 : γ2 + γ6 = γ3 + γ8 0.6132 0.0429
∗∗ 0.0244∗∗ 0.3192
H0 : γ2 + γ7 = γ3 + γ9 0.4682 0.0000
∗∗∗ 0.3064
H0 : γ2 + γ6 + γ7 = γ3 + γ8 + γ9 0.0996
∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0918∗
LogL −1795.320 −2346.414 −4002.785 −1208.921
Q(20) 32.077∗∗ 44.425∗∗∗ 18.044 39.245∗∗∗
Q2(20) 3.1754 14.375 230.15∗∗∗ 128.64∗∗∗
Note: Estimation results of the conditional variance of the exchange rate GARCH model:
rt = β0 + β1rt−1 + (β2 + β3FIRSTt−1 + β4SIZEt−1)It−1 + εt
εt = ε
†
th
1/2
t
ht = α0 + α1ε2t−1 + α2ht−1 +
(γ2 + γ6FIRSTt−1 + γ7SIZEt−1)
∣
∣I−t−1
∣
∣ + (γ3 + γ8FIRSTt−1 + γ9SIZEt−1)I+t−1
See Tables 1 and 2 for the sample size and period of each country; Dependent variable: Exchange
rate returns (log difference of US dollar / local currency) ; LogL denotes the value of the log likelihood
function; Q(20) denotes the Ljung-Box Q-statistic (with 20 lags) for the standardized residuals; Q2(20)
denotes the Ljung-Box Q-statistic (with 20 lags) for the squared standardized residuals. Standard errors
in brackets. FIRSTt is a dummy variable that is one if FIRSTt−1 = 0 and FIRSTt = 0, and cero
otherwise. SIZEt is a dummy variable that is one if |It| is bigger than the average forex intervention. p-
values of the Wald type test of four linear restrictions are also included. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ refer to significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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